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Abstract
This study investigates the nature of competitiveness among banks in Malawi 
where the industry is concentrated and the institutional base is weak. The study 
uses a model incorporating bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants of conduct and performance, based on monthly data from January 
2005 to March 2014. Key findings are asymmetric conduct with collusive price 
leadership in lending rates and competitiveness in deposit rates and overall high 
spreads. Apart from dominance, collusive price leadership was facilitated by 
regulatory stipulations in pricing in banks’ core and non-core business and an 
economic environment resulting in banks’ high profitability and diminished 
competitive pressure in lending rates. Further, monopolistic competition via 
outreach also put upward pressure on spreads most likely via costs as the 
literature suggests. 
Keywords: Collusive Pricing; Banks’ Risk Position; Banking Industry; 
Conduct and Performance; Malawi.
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1. Introduction
Imperfectly competitive markets invoke general fears of restricted output 
and monopolistic pricing which are detrimental to consumer welfare, and 
are associated with potential X-inefficiency and resource misallocation. For 
the financial services sector, as the life-blood of economic activity, excessive 
monopoly power would be bad especially for the economy and welfare. In 
order to grow and diversify their economies, underdeveloped countries need 
to improve financial intermediation through lower spreads that encourage 
savings mobilization and facilitate investment through reasonably high savings 
deposit rates and affordable borrowing rates (Beck & Hesse, 2006; Gockel & 
Mensah, 2006; Njenga & Sichel, 2012; Were & Wambua, 2013). In developed 
economies, collusive oligopolistic conduct tends to be addressed by strong 
institutions  which may not be there or as strong in less developed economies 
(Amidu & Wilson, 2014).
This study investigates pricing conduct in the banking industry of Malawi, 
which is among the world’s least developed economies and where the country 
and industry backgrounds point to an inclination of collusive behavior on the 
lending rates while new bank entry suggests competiveness on deposits rates. 
Previous studies have identified inflation, product diversification, and bank 
ownership as some of the factors that affect bank profitability (Al-Hashimi, 
2007; Chirwa & Mlachila, 2004; Flamini et al., 2009; Folawewo & Tennant, 
2008; Francis, 2013; Kanyoma, 2006). The few studies  that have looked at the 
effect of institutions have found mixed results (Amidu & Wilson, 2014).
The theory of imperfectly competitive markets suggests that market 
performance can be influenced by supply and demand conditions which can 
influence entry and exits. The demand side, in relation to overall revenue or 
pricing, can be influenced by firm conduct through non-price or monopolistic 
competition in areas such as product differentiation and diversification which 
are important for financial inclusion in developing countries and can have a 
significant impact on banks’ performance and of the economy as a whole. In 
the empirical literature on bank competitiveness reviewed below a number 
of things stand out. Firstly, most of the studies are focused on developed or 
emerging economies or regions where the industries had long consolidated and 
the issues of entry and exit are irrelevant. In contrast, the sub-Saharan African 
region has been subjected to recent entry-exit dynamics and exposure to new 
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and changing international standards. Secondly, the profile of monopolistic 
competition has been low, partly due to consolidated customer bases. Thirdly, 
many of the applications are based on cross-country panels where the operating 
environments are heterogeneous economically and institutionally. Fourthly, the 
measure of performance in most cases is profitability as an aggregate over core 
and non-core business.
This study contributes to a dearth of relevant empirical studies in sub-Sahara 
Africa even as the region is becoming increasingly important on the world stage 
(Tunyi & Ntim, 2016). Secondly, the country-based studies, like Chirwa and 
Mlachila (2004) and Beck and Hesse (2006), provide deeper and better insights 
about how shared institutional and operational environments can influence 
banks’ pricing conduct. This and data possibilities also allow for better informed 
model specification. The study specifically offers insights into monopolistic 
competition and the relevance of favorably intervened non-core bank business 
on pricing in core business. Thirdly, the study explicitly recognizes that banks 
approach pricing in their core business from two different perspectives, deposits 
as a cost and lending rates as a revenue source which respond differently to 
market and non-market stimuli like opportunities provided by monetary policy, 
and money markets in non-core business and risk factors. 
The findings, based on trend and econometric analyses, point to a weak 
and disarticulated institutional framework which together with the economic 
environment have been complicit in facilitating size/dominance collusive price-
leadership, making banks very profitable and weakening the compulsion for 
competitiveness. The central bank pricing interventions have been directly 
in banks’ favour in core and non-core areas. Structurally, the results indicate 
that though high profitability has attracted and sustained new entrants into the 
industry, non-price (non-cooperative) monopolistic competition would keep the 
new small, resulting in a market structure that has been changing only slowly 
with perpetuated dominance by a duopoly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section 1.1 outlines the 
background of the issues in Malawi; Section 2 gives the research objectives and 
key issues; Section 3 reviews the literature; Section 4 looks at the methodology; 
Section 5 contains results and the discussion, and; Section 6 concludes.
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1.1. Banking in Malawi and bank pricing conduct: a preview
1.1.1 The economy
The Malawi economy is dominated by uni-modal rain-fed agriculture which 
accounts for 30% of GDP, 90% of exports, and engages nearly 90% of the 
labour-force. All these have culminated in an incidence of poverty of nearly 
50% and makes food account for 51% of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Only 
19% of the adult population is banked.  The wider economic implications are 
an urgent need to finance economic diversification and structural transformation 
in the face of fiscal pressure to supply basic needs, and a heavy dependence on 
aid flows to support the budget as well as a source of foreign reserves. In the 
absence of a development banking segment the commercial banking sector has 
been fulfilling a number of important roles. Apart from being the main supplier 
of credit to the private sector, it interfaces with the instruments of monetary 
policy in moderating the inflation and foreign exchange rate and has been a 
major subscriber of credit to government in order to bridge fiscal deficits. 
1.1.2 Monetary and exchange rate policies and consequences
On its part, the central bank of Malawi has relied heavily on the bank rate as 
a key instrument of monetary policy. In an economic environment where the 
production of food has been precarious, inflation rates, and consequently the 
bank rate, have been in double digits for decades, with the exception of a short 
period. The foreign exchange rate regime had also been mismanaged moving 
from a flexible and market-determined rate to a virtually fixed one (2005-2012) 
culminating in the liquidity crisis in the wake of the May 2012 devaluation 
and float. The fixed exchange rate regime had been accompanied by other 
regressions in the market including the de-licensing of independent foreign 
exchange bureaux between 2008 and 2012.
The currency overvaluation during the fixed exchange rate regime and the 
subsequent withdrawal of IMF support in 2011 resulted in a worsening of foreign 
reserve shortages with banks having idle local currency which they channeled 
into longer-tenor treasury bills and other lending instruments. The devaluation 
in 2012 caught the banks short of liquidity when the foreign reserves became 
accessible but at the devalued foreign exchange rate and this fueled a bank 
liquidity crisis. Though brief, this experience for banks and the central bank, 
re-emphasised the liquidity and credit risk factors especially when banks have 
to respond to an already high but rising bank rate which also raises default rates.
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The scarcity and importance of foreign reserves in Malawi has meant that 
related transactions contribute as much as 25% of banks’ income (World Bank 
& IMF, 2008). A curious provision in the foreign exchange trading guideline 
imposed a maximum buying margin which the banks’ Financial Services Dealers’ 
Association embraced for uniform trading rates. The barring of independent 
dealers and the rents to banks from the pricing intervention1 contributed 
disproportionately to banks’ overall profitability with  average returns on assets 
as high as 5.33% between 2005 and 2015 compared to global average of 1.5% 
(Government of Malawi, 2009). 
1.1.3 Banking industry structure and pricing conduct
Since the dawn of financial liberalization in Malawi in 1987, liberalised entry 
raised the number of licensed banks from 2 to 11 by 20082. Although the 
Hirschman-Herfindhal Index (HHI) of concentration fell from 0.301 to 0.222 
for deposits, and from 0.286 to 0.193 for loans between 2001 and 2013, this is 
still higher than the rule-of-thumb upper limit for moderate concentration which 
is 0.1800 (World Bank & IMF, 2008). Moreover, the oldest and largest two 
banks have maintained a heavy dominance in total deposits and loans accounting 
respectively for 56% and 48% in 2013. Although such market concentration 
and common membership to associations could foster collusive behavior in the 
lending and deposit business, this orientation has been facilitated by yet another 
institutional curiosity. Before 2012, only the two largest banks were required to 
report their maximum lending rates (MLR) and either could take the lead and 
the rest follow. The central bank expected the other banks to base their own 
MLR on an average (Ngwira, 2014).  Between 2006 and 2011 the MLRs for the 
two largest banks were exactly the same and this was used by the rest; that is, 
there was collusive price leadership and followership was easier, quicker and 
less costly. The MLR was 32.3% in 2006, fell to 27.9% in 2007 and flattened 
out at 27.0% thereafter. 
The ratcheting of standards to compliance with the Basel II level, required 
stipulating stricter risk management as well as greater transparency in terms 
1 The FX Trading Guideline Article 4.3.
2 Four were registered before 2000 (National Bank, Standard Bank, FMB). Three more were registered 
by 2005, Ned Bank (2001), New Building Society Bank and Opportunity International Bank of Malawi 
(2003) and Malawi Savings Bank (2004) followed by First Discount House (2007) then EcoBank and 
Leasing and Finance Company (2008).
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of products and their pricing. From January 2012, all banks had to report their 
own MLRs resulting in a fall-out in the MLRs not just between the leading 
duo but among the rest with lagged or no reaction to monetary policy stimuli 
(Kaluwa, 2016). Conduct on the deposits side has been asymmetrical because of 
obvious and intensifying competitive pressure from new entry and market share 
considerations (see Figure 1). As avenues of collusion in lending have been 
closing, competition on the deposit side has manifested itself in new products 
such as savings bonds and special savings accounts and in some cases interest 
on current account balances.
FiGure 1: SavinGS depoSit rateS: Competitive Smaller BanKS But middle BanK 
dominanCe
Source: Calculated from Reserve Bank of Malawi Statistics
Notes: Largest dominated by NBM (2005-Jan2014), Middle by FMB (throughout), Small by 
INDE (2008+). NBM=National Bank of Malawi; STD=Standard Bank; NBS=New Building 
Society; FMB=First Merchant Bank INDE= IndeBank; NED=NedBank. NBM and STD had 
shares in deposit of 26% and 25% respectively in 2012. NBS and FMB are middle-ranking 
with respectively 14% and 10%, and NED and INDE among the smallest, with 2% and 4% 
respectively.
At the back of collusive MLR, Figure 2 indicates that spreads in Malawi have 
been high (20+) and influenced by both the bank rate and market power, the 
latter as reflected in banks’ market shares dominated by the two largest. 
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FiGure 2: SpreadS and BanK rate duality, hiGheSt For the larGeSt, lower For 
middle and Small
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi
Notes: NBS/FMB and NED/INDE averages for (NBS and FMB) and (NED and INDE)
Banks are more competitive in lending; the lower the Interest Income/Loans 
and advances ratio while in deposits, the higher the Interest Expense/Deposits 
ratio. From Figure 3, the largest banks were as competitive in lending as their 
followers - some middle ranked banks- and definitely more so than smaller ones 
like NED and International Commercial Bank (ICB). For deposits one of the 
two largest was among the most competitive while the other among the least. 
From the banks’ private profitability perspective, the smallest and follower 
banks could outperform the larger ones and so followership was not necessarily 
a disadvantaged position. This is another perspective of asymmetric conduct.
FiGure 3: returnS From loanS and CoSt oF depoSitS, 2009
Source: Individual bank reports
African Review of Economics and Finance
10
1.1.4. Implications for further analyses and interpretation
The foregoing suggests a problematic institutional framework and economic 
environment in Malawi. When it came to matters relating to bank pricing 
conduct in core and non-core areas, the central bank has had no inclination 
to intervene, except indirectly and lately through the pricing transparency 
requirements of the Basel standards. Worse than this, the central bank has in 
fact been complicit to pricing collusion by the following actions: facilitating 
price leadership-followership through the selective requirement that only the 
largest two banks reported maximum lending rates; guidelines supporting a 
maximum buying rate for foreign exchange while also excluding a competitive 
fringe of players. The economic environment on the other hand has also been 
characterized by high inflation rates as a risk factor that justifies high spreads 
and high Treasury Bill yields from high government fiscal deficits. The late 
presence of the Competition and Fair Trade Commission (CFTC) allowed 
associations serving the interests of banks3 to take advantage of the institutional 
lapses. These favourable conditions became banks’ “comfort zones” and can be 
held responsible for the banks’ lack of competitiveness in lending rates as well 
as lending conservatism towards the private sector. These need to be taken into 
consideration in further analyses and interpretations.
2. Research objectives and hypotheses
This study seeks to investigate the drivers or roadblocks to bank competitiveness 
in Malawi in a context of high industry concentration and a weak institutional 
framework and economic environment. On a general level a key issue to 
investigate would be whether and how the assumption of collusive pricing can be 
statistically established and economically explained in terms of the structure of 
the banking industry, bank-specific characteristics, institutional/regulatory and 
other influences in banks’ core and non-core business. Non-price competition, 
which can be observed at the bank level, can be beneficial for consumers and 
to firms whose aim would be to enhance monopoly power over pricing. For 
developing countries the benefits can include outreach. 
3. Literature Review
3.1. Theory 
The theory of market competitiveness had its major turning point in the development 
by Mason (1949) and Bain (1959) of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
3 Bankers Association of Malawi and Dealers Association of Malawi.
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framework, which provided a back and forth interface and interactions with 
subsequent applications. The SCP has four bi-directionally linked market blocs 
comprising the “basic conditions” of supply and demand, market “structure”, 
“conduct”, and “performance”. These market blocs are affected by another bloc, 
“government policy” which can be influenced by firm or market conduct through, 
for example, lobbying. Within the SCP, the concentration-profitability hypothesis 
which became quite influential was premised on Stigler’s (1964) expectation that 
oligopolistic markets with fewer firms will have an incentive to seek and succeed 
in attaining the most profitable pricing outcomes through collusion, express or 
tacit (Hannan, 1991b; Stigler, 1964). 
The major critiques of the SCP and its central hypothesis can be linked to 
the contextual and the conceptual bases, which in more recent developments 
have also become inter-linked. The so-called Chicago Revisionist School (CRS)
(Demsetz, 1973), contended that high profitability can result from efficiency and 
firms will tend to become larger on account of it and this is reflected in a positive 
association between concentration and profitability. The other issue concerned 
the role of market contestability, where it can be argued that in markets that are 
competitive, firms will respond to the prospects of entry (and exit). 
In the more recent developments, new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO) efficiency and contestability are addressed by focusing on the defini-
tion of competitive conduct and how it should be measured to reflect all market 
conditions. The measure of performance is based on the basic (demand and 
supply) conditions of the SCP to whose changes firms are supposed to respond. 
Firms in perfectly competitive markets will consider in their conjectures not 
only present but prospective competition and will therefore be more restricted 
in their mark-ups than those in imperfectly competitive ones. The empirical 
exercise could therefore involve just measuring market competitiveness. The 
Panzar and Rosse index is one such indicator which is based solely on inferring 
competitiveness out of estimated demand and supply equations. The indicator, 
the H-statistic, is defined as the sum of elasticities of total revenue to changes 
in each factor input’s price. Alternatively, these performance indicators could 
be related to other factors in the SCP. One application is through the Boone 
indicator in which efficiency is gauged through marginal cost and performance 
by market share and where the indicator shows better performance from greater 
efficiency (Boone, 2008; Panzar & Rosse, 1987).
The SCP, as an informal but quite comprehensive general framework, 
makes it flexible and amenable to new perspectives and accommodates some 
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seemingly theoretical upheavals. Under elements for structure and conduct 
it already provides for efficiency and also for contestability through barriers 
to entry. Importantly, it also takes account of institutional considerations in 
the “government policy” bloc which includes: regulation, incentives, and 
macroeconomic policies. But as originally conceived, there appears to be 
problems of omission or at least lack of emphasis. Underplayed issues in the 
SCP include the role of firms’ associations for possibly facilitating collusion, the 
role of the international environment, and the fact that efficiency is not always 
a determinant of size.
The link between market concentration and monopoly power is usually 
treated in probabilistic terms and in the theory this is not always potentially 
negative for the economy because of important differences between two aspects 
of conduct. Oligopolistic competition is the one associated with the possibility of 
monopoly power over pricing while monopolistic competition can be associated 
with potentially cost-raising conduct but which can confer benefits to consumers 
from diversified and differentiated products and better outreach and access. This 
is an aspect that is typically missed out or underplayed in applications. The 
Dorfmann-Steiner conditions explicitly recognizes the link between what may 
be called pricing in core business and optimizing behavior in other activities, 
which can be product differentiation or other activity. This is elaborated in the 
methodology. 
3.2. Review of empirical literature
Adaptations and applications of economic models to the banking industry, have 
required taking into consideration the fact that generally banking is subject to 
high profile regulation and subject to heterogeneity (Hannan, 1991a). Bank 
profitability, however measured, has been much higher in Sub-Sahara Africa than 
other regions of the world for more than a decade (KPMG, 2012; Unctad, 2009). 
Recent empirical studies suggest that market power in the banking industry 
can facilitate the tolerance of higher risk and bank inefficiency, for example, as 
inherent in Sub-Saharan African countries (SSA) (Flamini et al., 2009). 
Studies for the region have indicated that apart from credit risk, higher returns 
on assets are associated with larger bank size, activity diversification and private 
ownership. Furthermore, macroeconomic policies that promote low inflation and 
stable output growth have boosted credit expansion (Flamini et al., 2009) and 
affected profitability (Folawewo & Tennant, 2008; Francis, 2013; Gelos, 2009). 
On the other hand, variations in interest rate margins in 10 SSA countries reflected 
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operating inefficiencies (Al-Hashimi, 2007). In contrast to studies which find that 
macroeconomic risk has a significant effect on net interest margins (Al-Hashimi, 
2007), limited effects were found by  Chirwa & Mlachila (2004). The Greek 
experience (1985-2001), has been that the profitability of banks is shaped by 
bank-specific factors, as well as macroeconomic control variables which are not 
under the direct control of bank management, but the structure of the industry did 
not significantly affect profitability (Athanasoglou, Delis, & Staikouras, 2006). 
The study by Berger et al (2005) shows a positive relationship between foreign 
ownership and profitability while that for Uganda does not (Beck & Hesse, 
2006). In Africa, high and sustained profitability could be an incentive for entry 
by foreigners who would be less deterred by the finance capital barrier. 
The empirical literature suggests that risk management variables, associated 
with the new standards such as credit quality, core capital, non-interest bearing 
reserves and management quality, enhanced profitability in the USA (Angbazo, 
1997) and in Greece (Athanasoglou et al., 2006), while related regulation 
enhanced profitability in the EU and USA (Saunders & Schumacher, 2000). 
The persistence of high profitability of Sub-Saharan African banks has been 
attributed to risk associated with poor institutions for protecting creditor rights or 
risk associated with the economic environments including the political climate 
and the business cycle (including inflation) which among other problems raises 
the probability of loan defaults (Flamini et al., 2009). 
Beyond this higher risk- higher returns expectation, the market structure/
market power explanation also has credibility in the sense of high barriers to 
entry accounting for high levels of concentration which facilitate and sustain high 
levels of profitability. Concentration can itself be facilitated by a combination 
of the barriers to entry from a perceived risky environment for bank operations. 
From their perspective, banks could argue that they need high profitability to 
remain safer or to re-invest, which can lead to and sustain more and better 
services (Bikker & Hu, 2002; Flamini et al., 2009; Heggestad, 1977) . 
Table 1 presents a selective and stylised synopsis of the empirical literature 
on bank profitability in different regional and country contexts including 
environments likely to have stronger or weaker institutional bases against 
collusive behavior. The table is organized more around model configuration 
than on specific variables which is revisited under model specification. For 
convenience, we distinguish between Risk I - risk more closely related to bank 
operations - and solvency - the levels more closely associated with the quality 
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of bank management. Risk II is systemic risk related to industry-related policy, 
regulation and macroeconomic conditions. Noteworthy is that bank risks are 
related and they overlap. For example Risk I may be affected by elements of 
risk-reducing regulation such as statutory reserve requirements but which could 
also be discretionary and incorporated in bank-specific traits. In the table, Risk 
II can be disaggregated to accommodate differences in variables as used in the 
empirical studies. 
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Some earlier studies have accommodated to varying degrees the industry 
regulatory and monetary policy regimes as well as macroeconomic environments 
represented by Risk II factors. These include Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) for 
Malawi; Saunders and Schumacher (2000) for the EU and USA; Gelos (2006) 
for Latin America; and Flamini et al. (2009) for Sub-Saharan Africa (see notes 
to Table 1 above). They mostly do not go far enough to account for some 
intervention environments that have not been uncommon in SSA. 
The body of empirical results suggests that apart from the applications to 
the USA and EU/USA (excluding South-Eastern Europe and Greece), market 
power as measured by market share or size has been an important determinant 
of bank profitability along with Risk II factors. Outside these regions and in 
mixed cases market power definitely influences profitability. These results are 
what would be expected considering that market concentration would likely be 
lower in Europe and the USA compared to other regions. The interesting result is 
that in the less developed regions market power is interpreted as actually being 
motivated by inefficiency, only that the market power then allows the costs to 
be passed on to consumers (Al-Hashimi,2007; Gelos, 2009). This appears to be 
the view recently expressed for Malawi banking (World Bank & IMF, 2008). On 
the other hand, in the South-Eastern European studies, profitability is actually 
positively associated with operational efficiency (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2006) which is consistent with Berger (1995). Flamini et 
al. (2009) interpret their result on the size variable for profitability of SSA banks 
in terms of the positive effect of economies of scale or market power hypothesis, 
but their result also does not discount non-linearity as a result of inefficiencies.
The results in Table 1 are not inconsistent with the emphasis that has 
been placed on bank risk and the importance of solvency as an operational 
consideration or as a regulated requirement (Allen & Saunders, 2004). In fact, 
the Flamini et al. (2009) analysis suggests that there is no reason to believe that 
higher bank profits would automatically be retained to bolster the capital base 
and reduce solvency risk, implying that capital adequacy needs to be regulated. 
The African experience suggests an environment that is evolving and susceptible 
to international pressure for changed institutions and governance. In a recent 
paper that uses a panel involving 330 banks in Africa over the period 2002 to 
2007, Amidu & Wilson (2014) distinguish periods of increased competitiveness 
as being influenced by globalization and institutional quality.




The research started as a collaborative effort between the Department of 
Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, and the Reserve Bank 
of Malawi (RBM) (Malawi’s central bank). It was based on secondary source 
information including high-frequency monthly panel data, specifically defined 
and requested from the RBM. Additional data and information were obtained 
from individual banks. The research was in two stages. The first stage involved 
preliminary data analysis on trends in the banking industry structure, conduct, 
pricing conduct and the institutional environment (much of the trends have 
been put as background material). The next stage involved estimation of an 
econometric model, the interpretation of which results is linked to the analyses 
from the first stage. 
4.2. Model specification
Following Ho and Saunders (1981) Athanasoglou et al. (2005) and  Flamini et al. 
(2009) we specify a bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic model 
as:
Where:
Πit = Alternatively the Lerner index or net interest margin (as defined below) and 
nominal  spreads
Xjit = Vector of bank-specific factors including risk, response capability and 
capacity
Xnit = Vector of industry-specific factors such as monetary policy and regulation 
(bank rate, liquidity and capital adequacy), market structure and conduct 
including monopolistic competition 
Xmit = Vector of economy-wide or systemic (macroeconomic) factors such as 
the business cycle which in Malawi is reflected in the seasonality of agriculture 
output, the inflation rate and foreign exchange reserves. The Dynamic version 
that would have included       on the right-hand side to account for profit 
persistence (as compared to Flamini et al., 2009) was discounted because of the 
use of high-frequency monthly observations. 
(1)
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4.2. Accounting for monopolistic competition, interventions and incentives in 
non-core business
The study specifically assumes that banks in Africa as elsewhere are involved in 
interest business as the core activity promoted by non-price decision variables 
such as product differentiation. They also engage in other non-core/non-
interest business which in Malawi are significant sources of income. Dorfman 
and Steiner (1954) in what became known as the Dorfman-Steiner theorem or 
condition (DSC) established that profit maximising firms need to optimize in 
pricing and advertising by equating marginal cost of production and advertising 
respectively to marginal benefits. The  resulting expression for the optimal 
advertising level can be rewritten with pricing as a core decision variable,
 L= (P-MC)/P = (a/Pq.1/Ea).1/Ed      (2)
where  L is the Lerner index, P is price, MC is marginal cost, a is advertising 
budget, q quantities of core product(s),  Ea and Ed are respectively elasticity 
of advertising and price elasticity of  demand. The Lerner is inversely related 
to price elasticity of demand, Ed,  and directly related to advertising and its 
elasticity. This can be extended to all other product differentiation activities 
in the vector x in (3) below where the elasticity of demand for a core product 
related to an activity - such as outreach and product diversification - can influence 
monopoly power in the pricing of the core product(s).
 L = (P-MC)/P =(x, y)/Ed       (3)
A further extension is that the vector, y represents opportunities in non-core 
areas such as foreign exchange transactions and Treasury Bills that contribute 
significantly to bank profitability in Malawi as discussed above. Deraniyagala 
and Kaluwa (2011) suggest that these have contributed to banks’ lending 
conservatism towards the private sector. Another way to view this would be that 
the non-core activities in the vector y can influence pricing attitudes or behavior 
directly and not necessarily through demand elasticity as the vector x for 
example through reduced inclination for competitiveness in the core business. 
In related applications, along with other variables, non-interest bearing reserves 
were found to enhance profitability in the USA (Angbazo, 1997) and in Greece 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2006). Beck and Hesse’s (2006) study of the Ugandan 
banking industry uses an implied version of the augmented model suggested 
here and detailed in Table 2.
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In this study two related variants of pricing conduct are used, the Lerner index, 
L = (P-MC)/P = (P-AC)/P and Nominal Spreads, P-AC with P = maximum 
lending rate and AC = ordinary savings deposit rate which for relevance and as 
argued earlier, are both non-concessional. Spreads allow for dichotomous and 
asymmetrical behavior from different sources of stimuli, collusion in lending 
rates and competitive savings deposits rates resulting from new entry and small 
banks. Lending rates can respond to stimuli from regulation including the 
bank rate, liquidity requirement and macroeconomic volatility as represented 
by inflation. The Lerner, is a profitability index that is related to optimization 
across activity in core and non-core activities as in expression (3) and this is 
used to augment the model given in expression (1). The two contain exactly the 
same elements but will respond differently to similar impulses. 
4.4. Variable definitions and measurement
Table 2 presents the determinant factors and representative vector of variables 
that have been considered for the model in expression 1) and augmented by 
considerations in expression 3). 
Market structure: concentration and/or dominance? The Hirschman-Herfindahl 
index of concentration hhi represents market structure and the likelihood of 
collusive pricing while bank size, share in deposits depshare represents the 
prospects of price-leadership/followership.
Market structure (non-price/monopolistic competition): This is represented by 
number of staff and branches staff and branches which have been assumed 
to be correlated with other orthodox but more difficult to measure product 
differentiation activities.
Efficiency: Some studies have suggested that the high profitability of African 
banks is associated with high levels of inefficiency and high operational 
costs. The general literature also suggests foreign ownership might influence 
efficiency. In Malawi two of the three largest banks are foreign-owned and one 
has been a contender for the dominance/price-leadership role. Two variables 
have been considered for efficiency and the possibility of easing pressure on 
margins, foreign ownership, foreignown and income/staff costs, incstaffcost.
Regulation and the macroeconomic environment: The bank rate, br, is used 
to capture the effects of its prominent use as a regulatory instrument against 
macroeconomic volatility represented by the inflation inflation. 
Non-core business hypothesis in the Lerner: This is not prominent in the 
literature but for Malawi considerably boosts bank profitability and suspected 
of reducing the competitive pressure in lending rates. The non-core business 
variables include: orientation towards lending to government through Treasury 
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Bills measured relative to banks’ total assets, tbtassets; product diversification 
away from core-business, prodmix, and; the barring of independent foreign 
exchange bureaux activity between 2008 and 2012, fxtrans, measured as 
dummy (0 for “no bar” and 1 for “barred”).
The independent and control variables are indicated in Table 2. Apart from 
concentration, the regulatory and macroeconomic variables (br, fxtrans and 
inflation) the rest are bank specific.  Those in parentheses have a low profile 
in the literature. Except for monopolistic competition, the rest under “Detail I” 
corresponds to the literature. Notable exclusions are foreign exchange rate and 
the liquidity reserve ratio (lrr) because banks have used fixed margins on the 
rate and have carried liquidity in excess of the lrr.
TaBle 2: eStimated model and variaBleS
Factors Variables
Level Detail I Detail II Description Designation Type
Bank-
specific
Management Efficiency Income/staff 
cost
incstaffcost Independent






Credit risk Lending (Govt/total 
assets)
Tb/tassets Independent*

































Production Inflation inflation Independent
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*Denotes special relevance to this study 
Notes on explanatory variables: foreignown = majority foreign owned as a dummy 1, 0 otherwis: 
branches = number of branches: staff = number of employees; depshare = share in deposits; 
incstaffcost = income/staff costs; tbtassets = Treasury Bills/total assets;; govtshr = government 
shareholding; capadqcy = equity/total liability; prodmix = product mix (non-interest income/
total income); hhi = Hirschman-Herfindahl index of concentration; fxtrans = dummy 1, for 
proscription of non-bank linked foreign exchange dealers, 0 otherwise; br = bank rate.
Source: Computed by authors
The expectation is that all non-core business variables, which are bank 
specific, would confer an advantage to banks which would ease the pressure to 
compete i.e. a positive influence on monopoly power and spreads. 
4.5. Data
The estimated model was based on a non-random sample of six of the 11 licensed 
banks, namely,: National Bank of Malawi, Standard Bank, First Merchant Bank, 
New Building Society Bank, NedBank, and IndeBank. This yielded 111 monthly 
observations for each bank for the period January 2005 to March 2014.  This 
provided a total of N = 666 observations for the dependent and bank-specific 
variables. Data were from individual banks’ financial statements and returns 
to the central bank which yielded information on a wider range of seemingly 
relevant bank-specific variables, but with the danger that most would be related 
and doing the same job (Athanasoglou et al., 2006). One way to address this 
was to use variables derived from a number of other variables as long as the 
intended effects were correctly tracked and interpreted.
Data were requested and supplied by the central bank.  Both the bank and 
period samples were determined by requested and supplied data but have 
important statistical characteristics. The sample banks represent the Malawi-
specific banking industry characteristics which include the dominant and largest 
two banks, the next two (middle-sized) and two among the smallest. Between 
2009 and 2013 the sample banks had average shares in total deposits ranging 
from 3% to 28%. This compares to less than 1% for each of the two smallest 
which are outside the sample and would not likely influence market outcomes. 
The rest of the excluded banks are among the smallest and latest entrants. 
Among the newest banks, five were licensed between 2000 and  2005 and two 
after, namely First Discount House (FDH) (2007) and International Commercial 
Bank (ICB) (2008). During the 2005-2014 sample period, some settling of the 
market structure is reflected by a reduction in the HHI index of concentration.
Apart from entry, the period is also characterized by reversals of some pre-
May 2012 interventions in foreign exchange trading, a brief achievement of 
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single digit inflation rates necessitating a lowering of the bank rate, changing 
exchange rate regimes, and moving from a competitive foreign exchange market 
to one with regulated participation. The pre-January 2007 and post-May 2012 
periods exhibited competitiveness in lending rates and spreads interceded by a 
period of virtual collusive price-leadership eased again by the pro-competition 
transparency requirements of the Basel II standards from 2012.
5. Results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
In Table 3, the descriptive statistics of variables used in regressions are reported 
but succeeding comments are only made on a few.
TaBle 3: deSCriptive StatiStiCS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
spreadn 22.39 4.60 15.50 41.00
lerner 0.79 0.09 0.55 0.91
dshare 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.50
incstaffcost 7.48 12.53 2.86 85.24
tbtassets 12.99 18.17 0.81 125.88
foreignown 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00
govtshr 1.90 6.64 0.00 25.67
capadqcy 15.76 8.02 3.03 39.20
staff 485.74 288.62 79.00 966.00
prodmix 0.40 0.09 0.20 0.59
hhi 0.22 0.05 0.19 0.29
fxtrans 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00
br 18.81 4.94 13.00 25.00
inflation 13.60 8.06 6.30 37.91
Source: Calculated by authors
As can be seen from the table, the mean of the HHI (0.22) is above 0.18 
which is the rule-of-thump upper bound for “moderately concentrated”. Size as 
proxied by staff, shows huge disparities with the smallest bank having only 79 
employees compared to almost a thousand for the largest. Interest rate spreads 
have been very wide ranging from 15.50 to 41.00 percentage points with a mean 
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spread of 22.39 percentage points. Though not binding for the sample period 
as banks have tended to carry voluntary excess liquidity, the requirement has 
still been higher than the regional trends of close to single digit. Shocks in the 
later sample period have however made banks more vulnerable and sensitive to 
liquidity issues. A third of the banks had majority foreign ownership and this 
has to be linked to the issue of capital adequacy, which has wide variance and 
signals potential constraints faced by some banks. On the macroeconomic front, 
inflation, as a risk factor, averaged 13.6% and peaked at 37.91%, which has 
been high going by standards in the region.
5.2. Econometric estimation
From the perspective of econometric modeling, the implication of the rapid 
developments in the banking industry of Malawi is that there is no justification 
for assuming that a short sample period, of, say, less than 20 years, would reduce 
the problem of contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence (Baltagi, 2009). 
Shared industry experiences with regulation, standards and policy would lessen 
heteroskedasticity and enhance cross-sectional dependence. Bank-specific 
circumstances would enhance heteroskedasticity as well as autocorrelation. 
High-frequency data also pick up some in-firm traits and inclinations represented 
by bank-specific variables which interact with the changing environment as 
reviewed above. Some bank-specific variables such as firm-ownership have 
evolved from state-dominance to private-and-foreign ownership which interact 
(probably differently) with compliance with standards and almost certainly with 
monetary policy as a source of capital to finance operations. 
Tests were conducted for group wise heteroskedasticity, cross-section 
dependence and for first-order serial autocorrelation in panel data using the 
Modified Wald, the Breusch-Pagan LM and the Wooldridge tests. All three 
problems were confirmed in the Spreads and this was assumed to apply as a 
worst case scenario in the Lerner model. The estimation required taking into 
account the three problems as well as preserving the integrity of the economic 
framework of the model by accounting for data properties of some important 
variables such as those that become time-invariant when defined as dummies 
or were observable annually rather than monthly. Such variables would be 
deleted by two-step methods involving first-differencing. In this study, the time 
invariant explanatory variables are the dummies for interventions in the foreign 
exchange transactions, Fxtrans, and the concentration index, HHI, which has 
been measured on an annual basis. In the Lerner model, the dependent variable L 
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is bounded (0 ≤ L ≤1) and requires non-linear estimation. In Stata, two versions 
of generalized least squares were used. 
The Lerner model was estimated as a random effect censored Tobit while 
the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) was used for the Spreads model 
(Baltagi, 2009; Greene, 2003). Estimation of the former uses quadrature, which 
is an iterative approximation whose accuracy depends partially on the number 
of integration points used (Naylor & Smith, 1982; Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 
2004). The model passed the tests, since the coefficients did not deviate with 
variations in integration points. The FGLS in Stata allows estimation in the 
presence of panel specific autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional 
correlation and heteroskedasticity across panels.
TaBle 4: determinantS oF SpreadS and the lerner index (n = 666)
Determinants Detail I Detail II Variable Spreads Lerner
Bank-specific Market 
power
Size depshare 10.16*** 0.167***
(2.929) (0.0483)
Management Efficiency -0.00408 0.000578***
(0.0100) (0.000148)
Credit risk Govt/pvt tbtassets -0.00484 0.000459***
(0.00603) (0.0000940)




Liquidity risk (stds) capadqcy 0.00530 0.00213***
(0.0332) (0.000382)




Diversification prodmix 0.699 0.0949***
(1.609) (0.0185)
Industry Mkt structure Concentration hhi -17.48*** -0.268***
(5.077) (0.0557)
Reg/policy Directives fxtrans 0.0197 0.0302***
(0.274) (0.00545)




M/policy br 0.163*** -0.0130***
(0.0377) (0.000862)
External reserves 0.00427 -0.000160
(0.00689) (0.000194)









Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Notes: Spreads uses panel-specific AR1 autocorrelation structure. Lerner uses Panel Tobit 
5.3. Discussion
As discussed in Sections 1 and 3 a major contention and contribution of this 
study has been to acknowledge and use the fact that Malawi banks approach the 
pricing of savings deposits and lending differently even though they belong to 
the same market. The spreads results are supposed to deal more directly with 
this view while the Lerner equation is more oriented towards banks’ optimizing 
behavior across activities. A major difference between results in this and most 
earlier studies apart from Beck and Hesse (2006) is in that the dependent 
variables relate to core interest business rather than aggregate profitability, total 
revenue less total costs. 
The results of both the Spreads and Lerner equations in Table 4 indicate 
that monopoly power is positively influenced by banks’ market shares and 
negatively by market structure as represented by overall concentration. This is 
not inconsistent with the observed asymmetric conduct of (cooperative) price-
leadership collusion in lending rates and (non-cooperative) competitiveness in 
deposits as depicted in Figures 1 and 2. In the Malawi case price-leadership 
had been facilitated by dominance by a duo as illustrated in Figure 2 and an 
institutional lapse which encouraged collusion. This establishes the link between 
the conflicting concentration and market share results through dominance and 
leadership. The pricing asymmetry accommodates smaller and new banks to 
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jostle for market shares and enables them to achieve strong profitability results 
as in Figure 3. 
Other results like the association of foreign ownership and staff efficiency 
with higher spreads are also linked to the size/dominance price-leadership 
phenomenon via the large bank-higher cost argument (Beck & Hesse, 2006; Al-
Haschimi, 2007) which is said to apply to Malawi (World Bank & IMF, 2008). 
Flamini et al, (2009) contend that high margins facilitate the tolerance of high 
risk and bank inefficiency. 
Spreads respond to the bank rate as they should (in the Spreads equation) 
and through lending rates adjustments as the frontline decision variable. The 
inflation rate’s role in spreads is muted by its key role in influencing bank rate 
adjustments, a result that has been seen before (Chirwa and Mlachila, 2004).
The dominant firm price-leadership collusion phenomenon and results have 
been a major driver of lack of competitiveness in Malawi’s banking industry. 
It was facilitated by institutional mistakes in the regulation of banks’ pricing 
conduct in core and non-cores business as well as high yields of Treasury Bills. 
These allowed pricing collusion and high profitability which blunted the need 
for competitive lending in the core business. Although this study takes a different 
focus and view of the institutional environment the general thrust of the results 
support the findings by Amidu and Wilson (2014) about the negative effect of 
weak institutions on bank competitiveness in Africa. As far as market conditions 
and other conduct are concerned, monopolistic competition, which again has 
been associated with concentration and dominance, has also been a factor in 
diminishing   competitive pricing in core business and the likely channel is 
the high cost-high spreads as found by other studies (Beck & Hesse, 2006; Al-
Haschimi, 2007; Flamini et al., 2009).
 6. Conclusion
The results of this country-based study suggest that the African banking 
industry can be subjected to institutional and economic environments that 
can invite collusive conduct and offer incentives for lack of competition in 
banks’ core business. Major weaknesses of the present study stem primarily 
from what were its purported strengths, its focus. First, its focus on spreads 
based on core-business and coverage of a broader range of non-core business 
activity has probably improved relevance but reduced comparison with other 
studies. Secondly, its country focus and sensitivity to country dynamics has 
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meant that the sample period has quickly been overtaken by events such as two 
mergers and takeovers that occurred in 2015 and changed the configuration of 
dominance. Methodologically the biggest challenge has been from software and 
limitations of the tests on panel Tobit. Going forward a challenge is whether and 
how far the results obtained here are generalizable particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Another methodological issue is that a decomposition analysis might 
explain how much of the explanatory variables can explain changes in Lerner 
and Spreads overtime.
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